W&M ScholarWorks
Arts & Sciences Articles

Arts and Sciences

4-2021

Atheism in US and UK Newspapers: Negativity about Non-Belief
and Non-Believers
A. Maurtis van der Veen
William & Mary, amvanderveen@wm.edu

Erik Bleich

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/aspubs
Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Maurtis van der Veen, A. and Bleich, Erik, Atheism in US and UK Newspapers: Negativity about Non-Belief
and Non-Believers (2021). Religions, 12(5).
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050291

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Articles by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

religions
Article

Atheism in US and UK Newspapers: Negativity about
Non-Belief and Non-Believers
A. Maurits van der Veen 1, * and Erik Bleich 2
1
2

*

Department of Government, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23185, USA
Department of Political Science, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA; ebleich@middlebury.edu
Correspondence: amvanderveen@wm.edu

Abstract: Atheists are among the most disliked “religious” groups in the United States, but the origins
of this aversion remain poorly understood. Because the media are an important source of public
attitudes, we analyze coverage of atheism and atheists in American and British newspapers. Using
computational text analysis techniques, including sentiment analysis and topic modeling, we show
that atheism is portrayed negatively by the print media. Significantly, we show that greater negativity
is associated with atheism as a concept than with atheists as individuals. Building on this insight, and
challenging arguments that prominent atheist intellectuals attract negative coverage, we also find
that coverage of famous atheists is actually more positive than that of atheists or atheism in general.
Overall, our findings add a new dimension to scholarship on differences between individual-targeted
and group-targeted tolerance in public attitudes, establishing for the first time that media coverage
mirrors such differences.
Keywords: atheism; prejudice; computational text analysis; sentiment analysis; topic modeling
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1. Introduction

and UK Newspapers: Negativity

Popular perceptions of atheism present a puzzle: even though non-belief has been
rising steadily (Burge 2020), studies also find strong and persistent prejudice against atheists
across many different countries (Edgell et al. 2006; Gervais et al. 2017). One possible source
for such prejudice is media coverage, but until now there has been no systematic research
into how the media cover atheists and atheism. Is coverage of atheism actually negative in
ways that might help account for observed anti-atheist prejudice? If so, are there discernible
differences in the target of the negativity, such as between atheism as a doctrine and atheists
as individuals?
Answering such questions is crucial if we want to develop a better understanding
of the origins and persistence of anti-atheist prejudice. Until now, most inquiries have
focused on the nature of this prejudice, not its particular causes or components. One
common explanation is that many people believe atheists are amoral, or even immoral:
people see religious belief as a prerequisite for moral behavior (Franks and Scherr 2014;
Gervais et al. 2011). More specifically, they appear to distrust atheists’ capacity for caring
and compassion (Simpson and Rios 2017). In addition, a number of studies have shown
that many people think atheists are more likely than non-atheists to steal, abuse animals, or
even murder (Gervais et al. 2017; Giddings and Dunn 2016). These perceptions and beliefs
hold across many different countries (Gervais et al. 2017) and exist to some degree even
among atheists themselves (Gervais et al. 2017; Giddings and Dunn 2016).
As for the origins of the dislike many people feel for atheism and atheists, some scholars posit an important role for cultural evolution, arguing that a belief in a supreme being
who is “omniscient, powerful, and morally involved” may facilitate social cooperation and
may thus have conveyed cultural advantages over time (Gervais and Norenzayan 2013,
p. 133; Norenzayan et al. 2016). However, a cultural evolution argument is an indirect
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explanation at best: We still require a more immediate account of where people acquire
their beliefs about atheism and atheists.
It is well-established that the media serve as an important source for public attitudes
in general (Mastro and Tukachinsky 2014), as well as for attitudes towards specific religions
in particular (e.g., Dick 2019; Saleem et al. 2017; Schmuck et al. 2020). Indeed, this is the case
especially for religious groups with which most people in Western societies do not have
much conscious personal interaction, such as Muslims or Mormons (Pew Research Center
2007). It seems plausible, then, in light of pervasive general public antipathy towards and
distrust of atheists, that media coverage of atheism and/or atheists would also be quite
negative overall. However, we know neither whether this is true nor what such negative
coverage might be about. Is coverage driven by negative philosophical assessments of
atheism as the absence of religion? By negative accounts of major political actors often
associated in the public mind with atheism, such as the Soviet Union or China? By major
political controversies? Or by negative coverage of individual atheists?
Because so little is known, there is much to be gained from a detailed analysis of how
the media portray atheism and atheists. In this article, we first gauge the extent to which
coverage of atheism is negative; next, we systematically analyze the main topics present
in the coverage of atheism and test various potential explanations for negative coverage.
Specifically, using a corpus of more than 15,000 newspaper articles that mention atheism or
atheists drawn from leading newspapers in the United States and the United Kingdom,
we analyze the overall tone of coverage, the tone of the immediate context surrounding
references to atheism or atheists, the topics of these articles, and the people (and type of
people) they are most likely to identify as atheists. To do so, we deploy computational text
analysis methods including sentiment analysis, topic modeling, and collocation analysis.
Our contribution to the literature is both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, we
show that atheism is indeed portrayed negatively by the print media. Some of the most
negative coverage is associated with foreign news, but domestic coverage is negative as
well. Articles touching on domestic topics such as politics, education, and science are
not necessarily negative in and of themselves. However, we show that the sentences
mentioning atheism within such articles do tend to be negative even within articles that
are neutral or positive overall. Most importantly in theoretical terms, we show that media
coverage parallels public attitudes in displaying a “dilution effect”, in which people are
less tolerant of abstract groups than of specific individuals. In the media, analogously,
greater negativity is associated with atheism as a concept than with atheists as individual people.
Relatedly, and challenging arguments that prominent atheist intellectuals attract negative
coverage (Zenk 2013), we find that coverage of famous atheists is actually more positive
than that of most references to atheists or atheism. This is the first study to demonstrate that
the distinction between group-targeted and individual-targeted intolerance or prejudice
exists not just within people’s minds but is also reflected in media coverage.
The article proceeds in four parts. We begin by providing a brief overview of the
state of knowledge about the prevalence of atheism, public attitudes towards atheism, and
the impact of media consumption on public attitudes. Next, we introduce our corpus of
newspaper articles about atheism, after which we outline the text analysis methods we use.
The final section presents the analyses and discusses the results.
2. Atheism, Public Opinion, Prejudice, and the Media
People who do not identify with any (organized) religion represent a growing share
of the population in most countries in the Global North. For example, in 2007, 16% of the
American population self-identified as religiously unaffiliated; by 2014, this number had
climbed to 23%, and in the years since, it has risen further (Pew Research Center 2019,
p. 3). The number of people who explicitly identify as atheist is far smaller, due to stigma
associated with the label, at least in the United States (Scheitle et al. 2019); nonetheless,
this group, too, is undeniably growing (Pew Research Center 2019, p. 4). In the United
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Kingdom, meanwhile, more than half of the population does not identify with an organized
religion (Guardian 2021).
As these numbers suggest, it is impossible to pin down precisely the number of atheists
in a society. Doing so depends in part on one’s chosen definition of the concept: Is atheism
the absence of a belief in a god or, instead, the belief that there is no god? Or is it simply
uncertainty about the existence of a god? The range of possibilities has led to a profusion
of related terms—agnostic, secularist, humanist, and “none”, among others—along with
scholarship attempting to clarify the distinctions (e.g., Quillen 2015; Burge 2020). While
clarity is helpful, and crucial for those interested in the precise number of people who can
be characterized as atheist, it is less important for our purposes. Our focus here is not on
the precise meaning of the term, but rather on how and when it is used in the media.
Regardless of the precise number of atheists in society, there is little doubt that this
number is rising in many countries around the world (e.g., WIN-Gallup International
2012). Yet, large portions of the general public view atheism and atheists with concern
or dislike. The Pew Research Center regularly asks American respondents about their
feelings towards different religious groups, using a feeling “thermometer” scale from 1 to
100. Precise feeling ratings fluctuate, but the ordering has remained stable, with Muslims
and atheists at the bottom and Mormons a little higher. All three groups are ranked well
below Jews and a variety of Christian denominations. In the most recent survey, in 2017,
the thermometer rating for atheists was 50 (compared to 48 for Muslims, 54 for Mormons,
and upper 60s for Jews and some Christian groups) (Pew Research Center 2017). This was
an improvement over 2007, when the rating for atheists was just 35, compared to 43 for
Muslims and 53 for Mormons (Pew Research Center 2007).
The key concern for many people appears to be that they perceive atheists as lacking
in terms of their caring and compassion for other people (Simpson et al. 2019; Simpson
and Rios 2017) and that (for this reason) atheists cannot be trusted (Gervais et al. 2011).
Relatedly, Franks and Scherr show that negative feelings are particularly driven by disgust,
distrust, and fear and that atheists face more prejudice than do LGBTQ people or people of
color (Franks and Scherr 2014). These negative perceptions have implications for outcomes:
atheists are less likely to be accepted, both in private interactions and as public figures, than
are members of a long list of other groups (Edgell et al. 2006, 2016). Moreover, atheists are at
a particular disadvantage compared to other religious groups, as “increasing acceptance of
religious diversity does not extend to the nonreligious” (Edgell et al. 2006, p. 211). Indeed,
in a 2019 survey, 20% of respondents in the United Kingdom and 44% of respondents in the
United States said, “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good
values (Pew Research Center et al. 2020, p. 3).
While a substantial number of studies have focused on the United States, Gervais
et al. showed that many of the patterns identified above hold across countries. Their
study finds anti-atheist prejudice in 12 of the 13 countries studied, with Finland being the
lone exception (Gervais et al. 2017, p. 2). Other research looking at individual countries
reinforces these findings. For example, Giddings and Dunn find anti-atheist prejudice to be
robust in the United Kingdom (2016), and Clobert et al. find that while religious Taiwanese
tend to be accepting of other religious groups, this tolerance does not extend to atheists
(Clobert et al. 2014, p. 1522). Finally, analyses of the World Values Survey, covering dozens
of countries, show that in most countries with religious majorities, people tend to doubt
the fitness for public office of atheists (Inglehart et al. 2004).
As this last point suggests, for some people, the lack of religious belief itself appears to
be the crucial issue—not the possible implications of that lack of belief for an individual’s
behavior or morality. Scholars have identified a “dilution effect”, by which information
about particular individuals serves to reduce the impact of prejudice against groups of
which those individuals might be members (Nisbett et al. 1981; Hilton and Fein 1989; Fein
and Hilton 1992). Golebiowska has shown that this dilution effect operates in political
contexts, including when the group membership is not physically obvious, as is the case
with atheism (Golebiowska 1996, 2003). In addition, it applies “even when people have

Religions 2021, 12, 291

4 of 20

essentially no information about the individual or collective they are judging” (Critcher
and Dunning 2014, p. 687). In fact, a separate literature on perspective-taking shows that
even exposing people to imagined interactions with individual members of a disliked
outgroup reduces prejudice (Broockman and Kalla 2016; Paluck et al. 2020; Turner and
Crisp 2010). In line with this literature, Swan and Heesacker find that it is the fact of
not believing in a God, rather than individual actions or attitudes, that prompts dislike.
Moreover, seeing an atheist as an individual, with additional characteristics besides simply
that label, dramatically reduces dislike (Swan and Heesacker 2012, pp. 37–38).
On the other hand, some specific atheists may be subject to consistently negative
coverage. As Taira notes, the media readily “criticize and even ridicule” people such as
British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, who has become prominent as one of
the “New Atheists” (Taira 2015, p. 110). Similarly, Zenk finds it striking how many of
the themes “found in the discourse on ‘New Atheism’ are negative” (Zenk 2012, p. 44).
Finally, some have suggested that the atheist label itself is toxic (e.g., Dennett 2003). In
fact, “atheist” appears as a negative word in a widely used lexicon of positive and negative
words (Baccianella et al. 2010). Given these negative connotations, it is no surprise that
the number of people who do not believe in a god is larger than the number who identify
themselves as “atheist” (Kosmin et al. 2009, p. 14).
Media coverage is likely an important factor shaping public beliefs about atheists and
atheism. Media consumers can glean negative information about groups even through
skimming newspaper articles or headlines (Weinberger and Westen 2008), and the impact
is greater if exposure is repeated (Fairclough 2013, p. 45). Once an opinion about another
group—including a prejudice—takes root, it can be difficult to change (Lupia et al. 2015,
p. 1; but see Mastro and Tukachinsky 2014; Schemer 2012). Media consumers may thus
be left with conscious or subconscious negative attitudes (Erisen et al. 2014; Arendt and
Northup 2015; Pérez 2016; Kroon et al. 2020). Scholars have shown how this dynamic
operates with respect to marginalized groups in a wide variety of settings (Eberl et al.
2018).
We are not aware of any studies combining insights from the literature on individualtargeted versus group-targeted intolerance with analyses of media portrayals of groups.
This is surprising because, given the close connection between media coverage and public
beliefs, we might expect to find differences between individual-targeted and group-targeted
references to (members of) groups. In particular, it seems plausible that the media might
be more negative about a religion (seen as the characteristic shared by a group) than about
individual adherents of the religion.
The idea that public dislike of atheism and atheists implies that the media are likely to
be negative about them is at odds with some of the literature on religion in the media, which
argues that the media in many Western countries have become increasingly secularized,
following along with its respective society. As a result, the argument goes, many public
and media figures have become skeptical and disparaging of religious practices (Casanova
2006; Cesari 2007; Roy 2016; Brubaker 2017). However, a closer look at the media in some
of these countries suggests a more equivocal stance. Specifically, Silk asserts that “The
American news media presuppose that religion is a good thing . . . As hostile, ham-handed,
or ignorant as their approach may sometimes appear, the media will never be caught
attacking religion as such” (Silk 1998, p. 57). Even in the case of the UK, Knott, Poole, and
Taira suggest that the common notion of a secularist media “should be challenged or at
least refined”, finding that “The media is rarely anti-religious” and “it is rare to find an
overtly positive media representation of atheism and its supporters” (Knott et al. 2013,
p. 117).
A small number of studies have looked, impressionistically, at the coverage of atheism
in the media. In a historical overview, Drescher shows that the media long offered religious
leaders a platform for disparaging atheism (Drescher 2014). Moreover, at the height of
the Cold War, atheism was portrayed as foreign and linked to Communism. Over time,
however, the coverage of atheism in the United States has shifted from “being that of a
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Christian heresy to an independent social movement with its own identity and culture”
(Cimino and Smith 2014, p. 2). In the New York Times, at least, “The assumption of both
news and opinion articles . . . is that atheism is an acceptable choice to be represented
alongside religious belief” (Cimino and Smith 2014, p. 5).
Studying the United Kingdom, Knott, Poole, and Taira find the discussion of atheism
and secularism to be centered around the place of religion in public life and around
atheists’ campaigning for visibility. They note that prominent former Oxford University
scientist and author Richard Dawkins has effectively “hijacked the media portrayal of
atheists and of non-religious people in general.” Given Dawkins’ professional training,
it is not surprising that Knott et al. find that discussions of atheism also focus on the
(in)compatibility of religion and science (Knott et al. 2013, p. 107). Taira similarly highlights
Dawkins’ visibility in the media’s coverage of atheists, noting that “media find it convenient
to cover antireligious atheists, but difficult to render visible people of no religion who are
not interested in campaigning against religion” (Taira 2015, p. 118).
The preceding overview gives rise to several hypotheses. We start with the possibility
that coverage of atheists and atheism is not actually negative or perhaps is even positive,
as the literature on secularization might lead us to expect. On the other hand, given what
we know about public opinion regarding atheism and about the media’s impact on public
attitudes, we expect coverage to be negative. In that case, it becomes crucial to examine
in what ways and about whom it is negative. One possibility, still partly in keeping with
the hypothesis that coverage is not negative, is that atheism is simply associated with
negative topics: In other words, negative coverage might not be negative about atheism
per se. For example, during the Cold War, atheism was associated with Communism and
the Soviet Union; today, it might be associated with China. More broadly, foreign news
is likely to be more negative than domestic news (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and
O’Neill 2017). Negative coverage of atheism might thus be a result not of anything intrinsic
to atheism or atheists but, rather, of their frequent presence in foreign news. Taken together,
(H1) and (H2) constitute the null hypothesis for our study: that media coverage is not
actually negative about atheism (and, accordingly, cannot directly account for negative
public attitudes):
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Media coverage of atheism is not negative.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Media coverage of atheism itself is not negative, but atheism is associated
with negative topics, especially foreign news.
If the coverage of atheism and atheists is in fact negative, the literature on the dilution
effect and individual-versus group-targeted tolerance suggests that this negativity should
be associated more with atheism as a belief, or group characteristic, than with atheists
as individual people. While these theories have not previously been tested on media
coverage, the close connection between the media and public attitudes suggests that the
same patterns might be evident in the media. Alternatively, specific atheists might be
covered more negatively than the abstract idea of atheism. The media may be drawn to
coverage of prominent atheists (Taira 2015, p. 118), and such coverage may well be critical
of perceived militancy and aggressiveness (Zenk 2012). If so, we would expect coverage
of prominent atheist intellectuals to be disproportionately negative, especially in terms of
how they are described as people. We test each of these alternative hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Negative coverage is primarily about atheism, not individual atheists.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Atheists are systematically described in negative terms, and coverage of
prominent atheists is disproportionately negative overall.
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These hypotheses have dramatically different implications for our understanding of
both how the media cover atheism and how consumers may develop negative associations
with atheists and atheism.
3. Data
We collected a corpus of all articles mentioning atheism or atheists in four major
nation-wide United States newspapers and the three top British broadsheet newspapers,
along with their Sunday counterparts, for the years 2000–2018. We selected these countries
for two reasons. First, they have been the targets of a disproportionate share of scholarship
about public attitudes towards atheism. In particular, studies and surveys in both countries
confirm broad anti-atheist prejudice (Edgell et al. 2016; Giddings and Dunn 2016; Pew
Research Center et al. 2020). Second, the literature on secularism and religion in the media
suggests that the US media might be more negatively disposed towards secularism in
general and atheism in particular than the UK media. Accordingly, some of our hypotheses
may receive confirmation in one country but not the other, adding nuance to our findings.
Because it is impossible to sample every media source in both countries, we limited
ourselves to leading, national non-tabloid newspapers in both countries. These are of
particular interest because they have country-wide readership and because other media
outlets often take cues from large, national papers (Vargo and Guo 2017; Golan 2006;
Zhang 2018). In particular, the four US newspapers we selected included the two largestcirculation papers (USA Today and Wall Street Journal) and the two papers that are widely
considered “newspapers of record” (New York Times and Washington Post).1 For the United
Kingdom, we similarly selected the two “newspapers of record” (Times and Telegraph);
because both lean right politically and we did not want to privilege a particular political
ideology, we added the largest-circulation left-leaning national broadsheet (Guardian). To
collect the articles for our corpus, we searched NexisUni for the word stem “atheis*”, so as
to capture all possible endings: The asterisk is a wildcard indicating that we will capture
any word beginning with the letters “atheis”—“atheism”, “atheist”, “atheistic”, etc. Table 1
shows the results by newspaper source.
Table 1. Atheism corpus: number of articles by source.
atheis*
New York Times
USA Today
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
US total
Guardian/Observer
Times/Sunday Times
Daily/Sunday Telegraph
UK total
Combined total

2439
471
659
1656
5225
4052
3734
2110
9896
15,121

Note: * = includes articles containing any word beginning with the letters “atheis”.

Although our hypotheses do not speak to over-time variation, it is worth briefly
examining patterns in publication over time to make sure that unusual spikes in coverage
do not bias our overall findings. Figure 1 shows the annual article count. Our corpus
contains more articles from the United Kingdom each year; the difference in total articles
between the two countries is highest around 2010, due to the emergence of the so-called
“New Atheism” movement, spearheaded by authors such as Richard Dawkins. As Figure 1
makes clear, the resulting debates have produced a sustained increase in the media’s
coverage of atheism and atheists: Even at the lowest point in recent years, in 2017, coverage
remained noticeably higher than at the beginning of the century in both countries.
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than 63% of newspaper articles. The same sentiment analysis approach has been used
successfully to assess the tone of media coverage of a number of different topics (including
religious issues) in the US and UK media (e.g., Bleich et al. 2018a, 2018b; van der Veen and
Bleich 2021). Based on these studies, it is possible to roughly classify the level of negativity
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Table 2. Overview
topics in the atheist
corpus.
Categoryof the 15 substantive
Topic
Top Words
Foreign
Category
(8.2%)

Foreign
(8.2%)

Topic
Bangladesh
China

Bangladesh
Russia

China

Bangladesh,
Top
Words Dhaka, blogger,
UK%
hacked, bloggers
Bangladesh,
China, Chinese, Beijing,
communist, Lama 1.2
Dhaka, blogger,
Russia,
Russian, Soviet, Moscow,
hacked, bloggers
orthodox
China, Chinese,
Beijing,
2.1
communist,
Lama

UK%

US%

1.2

US%
1.6

2.1

1.6

3.1

5.0
4.3

5.0
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Table 2. Cont.
Category

Topic

Top Words

UK%

US%

Religion—
specific
(14.9%)

Catholicism

pope, Vatican, Catholic, Benedict,
church

6.9

5.4

Islam

Islam, Muslim, Muslims, Islamic,
Saudi

8.9

8.0

Religion

religion, religious, faith, God,
Christian

22.6

13.4

Faith

onfaith, commentary, Washington
Post, spirited, Quinn6

0.3

2.7

9.2

0.6

3.2

10.3

7.8

22.6

0.6

5.6

12.2

6.9

6.3

1.1

10.0

11.3

5.5

1.1

Religion—
general
(20.2 )

Politics
(38.1%)

UK politics
US politics
Legal
Pledge

Other
(28.6%)

Science
Education
Entertainment
Broadcast
schedule

minister, prime, labor, Blair,
Cameron
Republican, Obama, president,
voters, Republicans
court, government, group, law,
state
pledge, court, Newdow,7
allegiance, supreme
science, Dawkins, evolution,
scientific, scientists
schools, education, school,
children, pupils
theater, film, play, music,
production
val, pm, radio, BBC, day

Percentages indicate the share of articles with that topic as the top topic (by country).

The final computational method we used was collocation analysis, which examines
word usages and contexts systematically. This allowed us to ascertain whether a word’s
appearance in a particular context is statistically and substantively significant. For example,
if we look at the immediate neighbors of the word “atheism”, do we encounter certain
negative words more often than we would expect, given the overall frequency of those
words in newspaper articles? If so, that indicates that such negative words are associated, in
textual terms, with “atheism” and—as a result—may well become associated with atheism
in readers’ minds.
5. Analysis and Discussion
We began by analyzing the tone of texts that mention atheists or atheism in British
and American newspapers. As we saw in our overview of the literature, very little has
been written about the tone of media coverage of atheism. Knott et al. argue that, in the
United Kingdom, “it is rare to find an overtly positive media representation of atheism
and its supporters” (Knott et al. 2013, p. 117), while Cimino and Smith note that in the
United States (or, rather, in the New York Times) atheism is portrayed as “an acceptable
choice to be represented alongside religious belief” (Cimino and Smith 2014, p. 5). These
two assessments are not incompatible, but they leave a lot of room for interpretation: What
tone do we expect to be associated with “overtly positive” or “acceptable choice” coverage?
Table 3, showing the average tone for different sets of articles and sentences in our
corpus, offers an answer to these questions. The first row indicates that, in both the
United Kingdom and the United States, articles that reference atheists or atheism are
negative overall, albeit only mildly so. The next line, however, shows that those sentences
that actually reference atheism or atheists are clearly negative on the scale introduced in
Figure 2. We can thus reject our first null hypothesis (H1) that media coverage of atheism is
not negative. Table 3 also provides insight into which types of reference are most negative.
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Sentences that mention “atheism” and “atheistic”, which refer to beliefs rather than people,
are substantially more negative than those mentioning “atheists”, which refer to people;
“atheist”, which can refer to either a belief (as an adjective) or a person (as a noun), falls in
between. This serves as preliminary evidence in support of (H3) (negativity is about the
idea) and against (H4) (negativity is about the people).
Table 3. Sentiment analysis: the average tone of texts referencing atheism or atheists.

Articles
Sentences
Sentences contain:
“atheism”
“atheistic”
“atheist’
“atheists”

UK

US

−0.12
−0.34

−0.04
−0.32

−0.57
−0.49
−0.33
−0.18

−0.39
−0.63
−0.31
−0.17

Next, we turned to the topics of the articles in our corpus: What are articles that
mention atheism or atheists actually about? The initial overview of our topic model, shown
in Table 2, already indicated that they are often not primarily about atheism or atheists.
Table 4 lists the average valence of articles in our corpus by topic, allowing us to test our
second null hypothesis (H2), that atheism is associated with negative topics, especially
foreign news. Table 4 confirms our expectation that foreign news is negative overall: All
three foreign topics are negative, as are the two topics about a particular religion, both of
which are about religions that have a far stronger presence outside the UK and the US than
they do inside.
Table 4. Topic model: the average tone of articles about a topic by country.
Category

Topic

UK%

UK Tone

US%

US Tone

Foreign

Bangladesh
China
Russia

1.2
2.1
3.1

−2.08
−0.37
−0.28

1.6
5.0
4.3

−1.78
−0.28
−0.32

Religion—specific

Catholicism
Islam

6.9
8.9

−0.25
−0.94

5.4
8.0

−0.16
−0.86

Religion—general

Religion
Faith

22.6
0.3

0.00
0.26

13.4
2.7

0.09
0.92

Politics

UK politics
US politics

9.2
3.2

−0.04
−0.28

0.6
10.3

−0.04
−0.12

Legal
Pledge
Science
Education
Entertainment
Broadcast sched.

7.8
0.6
12.2
6.3
10.0
5.5

−0.48
−0.12
0.13
0.35
0.23
0.13

22.6
5.6
6.9
1.1
11.3
1.1

−0.36
0.01
0.21
0.35
0.23
0.17

Other

It is difficult to say whether the salience of these five foreign topics is unusual.
Moore (2010) finds that about 10% of UK newspaper coverage is dedicated to foreign
news; comparable data for the US are lacking, but studies on the level of foreign news on
television suggest that it is reasonable to assume that the US figure is in the same range
(Aalberg et al. 2013). The sum of the shares of the three foreign topics is a little below that
number: 8.2% overall across both countries. However, if we add in the two specific religion
topics, which are often foreign news—articles in the Catholicism topic are often about the
Vatican and the Pope, while articles in the Islam topic are often about Muslim-majority
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countries in the Middle East—its size nearly triples to 23%: significantly greater than the
overall share of foreign news in the media.
We cannot conclude with confidence that atheism is disproportionately associated
with foreign news: This depends on whether one judges articles about Catholicism or
Islam to be foreign. However, we can infer that negative coverage of atheism is not driven
uniquely by its connection to foreign topics. While the foreign topics are among the most
negative in our corpus, they simply do not account for a large enough share of articles
to explain the negativity associated with atheism at the sentence level shown in Table 3.
Indeed, as we shall see below, even within the non-foreign topics, which are balanced
between negative and positive, references to atheism at the sentence level remain negative
in tone.
For the same reason, given the share of articles assigned to topics whose average tone
is positive in our corpus, it seems implausible that the tone of sentence-level references to
atheism and atheists is driven only by the association of atheism with negative topics. In
fact, the average tone of such sentence-level references, for sentences in articles assigned to
one of the six positive topics in Table 4 only, is −0.11: less negative than the overall figure,
but modestly negative nonetheless. We can thus also reject our second null hypothesis:
that negativity in the coverage of atheism is due to its association with negative topics,
especially with foreign news.
Next, we examined whether the negativity associated with atheism and atheists in
the media is associated more with ideas or with people. In order to avoid biasing results
by the overall negative tone of foreign news, we excluded our five foreign topics from the
following analyses. Of the remaining 10 topics, two are about general issues of religion
and faith. Four are about politics: one topic each for UK and US politics in general, plus
two about legal issues. One of these focuses on the US Pledge of Allegiance, which, since
1954, includes a reference to God and is often recited in schools. As is clear from Table 4,
legal issues associated with atheism are far more salient in the United States than in the
United Kingdom.8 The final four topics cover science, education, entertainment, and
broadcast scheduling. Richard Dawkins figures prominently within the science topic; not
surprisingly, this topic is almost twice as prominent in the UK media as it is in the United
States. Education is a much more prominent topic in the UK than in the US; this is likely a
result of US discussions of atheism in the context of education getting wrapped up into
legal debates about the Pledge of Allegiance and the First Amendment.
For the next analysis, we focused on articles whose main topic is one of these 10
non-foreign topics (a total of 6769 articles).9 In addition, we pooled articles from the United
Kingdom and the United States together, because Table 4 shows that coverage of atheism is
comparable across these two countries: The correlation between the two countries in terms
of the average tone of the different topics is a very high 0.96, and even the prominence of
different topics (as shares of all articles) is correlated, albeit at a lower 0.53.10 The possibility,
raised earlier, that the UK media would be more positive about atheism because they are
more secularist than their US counterparts is not borne out by the data presented above in
Table 3.
We began by comparing how “atheism” and “atheistic” are covered compared to
“atheist” and “atheists”: The latter are generally used to refer to people; the former more
abstractly to beliefs. Table 3 already indicates that the latter are associated with more
negative coverage; however, this could be due to their disproportionate presence in foreign
coverage. Table 5 presents comparable data for the part of the corpus whose main topic
is one of the 10 non-foreign topics. Rather than present data on every subset, we show
data for the most consequential division: those articles that contain the words “atheism”
or “atheistic” and that thus reference ideas, compared to those that do not and that thus
reference people. Table 5 also lists the top 10 common adjectives that are most strongly
associated with these terms, as indicated by a collocation analysis comparing words in
sentences containing each term to the full texts of the newspapers from which we drew our
corpus.11
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Table 5. Tone and top collocates in articles on non-foreign topics: atheism vs. atheist(s).

Subset

Text contains “atheism”
or “atheistic”
(collocations for same)

Text does not contain
“atheism” or “atheistic”
(collocations for
“atheist”, “atheists”)

Article Valence
(Mean)

N

1832

0.07

4935

0.04

Sentence
Valence
(Mean)

Top 10 Adjective
Collocates
(Sentence-Level)

−0.33

Godless, agnostic,
dogmatic, humanist,
secular, evolutionary,
fundamentalist, militant,
evangelical, insulting

−0.20

Agnostic, deist,
humanist, nonreligious,
godless, avowed,
rationalist, unaffiliated,
irreligious, secular

These data offer additional support for (H3) (negativity is primarily about atheism
as a set of ideas) and against (H4) (negativity is primarily about atheists as individual
people). The valence data reinforce the message from Table 3: Within non-foreign articles,
the average tone of full articles remains close to neutral, while that for sentences referencing
atheism is clearly negative. Moreover, that negativity is greater for sentences mentioning
“atheism” or “atheistic” than it is for those mentioning “atheist” or “atheists”, where the
average tone is only modestly negative.12 The difference is accentuated when we examine
the top adjectives listed in the right-hand column. For “atheism” and “atheistic”, this
includes the clearly negative terms “dogmatic” and “insulting”, along with the arguably
negative terms “godless”, “fundamentalist”, and “militant”. To give just one example of a
sentence with one of these negative terms, an article titled “Is atheism just a rant against
religion?” in the Washington Post (26 May 2007) contains the sentence “Atheism’s new
dogmatic streak is not that different from the religious extremists it calls to task, he said.”
13 In contrast, for “atheist” and “atheists”, the list in Table 5 only contains one arguably
negative term: “godless”. Sentences containing “atheist” and “atheists” are still negative
overall, however, because (similar to sentences containing “atheism” and “atheistic”) they
also include words that do not stand out as much for their presence in this context but that
do have a strong negative tone or connotation.
The second part of (H4) predicted coverage of prominent atheists to be disproportionately negative overall and, relatedly, for such atheists to be described in negative terms.
Public intellectuals who are known in part as a result of their outspoken atheism include
Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and
Bill Maher—the first five have all written books in which atheism features prominently;
the last produced a movie challenging religion, Religulous. In addition, our corpus contains
repeated references to one leading politician widely known to be (and described as) atheist:
former British Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg of the Liberal Democrats. Table 6 lists
the average tone of articles and sentences in our full corpus—not excluding the foreign
categories—in which Clegg or any of the six public intellectuals appear. We added a
separate row for Richard Dawkins by himself in light of his prominence.
Table 6. Sentiment analysis: the average tone of texts containing the names of prominent atheists.14
Articles

Public intellectuals (n = 6)
Richard Dawkins
Nick Clegg

Mentioning Name

With Sentences Mentioning
Name and “atheis*”

N

Valence
(Sentences)

N

Valence
(Sentences)

1961
1561
155

−0.14
−0.10
0.11

1045
840
51

0.05
0.12
0.28

Note: * = includes articles containing any word beginning with the letters “atheis”.
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Table 6 shows that prominent atheists are not covered in unusually negative terms.
Sentences including a word beginning with “atheis” are only mildly negative—less negative
than the overall values shown in Table 5. Strikingly, in articles where these prominent
atheists are explicitly identified with atheism—their name appears in a sentence also
containing an “atheis” word—the average tone of atheis* sentences is actually positive.
This is a marked contrast to every other sentence-level measure we have seen so far,
all of which were negative. Even in non-foreign articles not mentioning “atheism” or
“atheistic”, Table 5 showed that the mean sentence-level valence for sentences mentioning
atheist(s) was −0.20. In other words, well-known atheist intellectuals are described in
terms that are decidedly less negative compared to other atheists. The same applies even
more strongly to the politician most explicitly associated with atheism, Nick Clegg: Both
sentence-level measures are actually positive. For example, a 24 December 2007 article in
The Guardian noted that “If anything, the religious are overrepresented in politics, so there
should be opportunities for atheists such as Mr. Clegg.” Based on the results presented in
Tables 5 and 6, we can confidently reject (H4) (that negativity associated with atheism is
about specific atheists).
One implication of this last finding is that in articles not mentioning highly visible
atheist intellectuals, sentences mentioning atheism or atheists must actually be more
negative than we saw in Table 5. In fact, the adjusted values are −0.44 (was −0.33) and
−0.23 (was −0.20), respectively. In other words, the difference in the tone of coverage
between articles mentioning “atheism” or “atheistic” and those that do not looms even
larger when we take away texts that mention the most prominent atheists. This adds
further support to (H3) and to the group versus individual intolerance dynamic that the
hypothesis represents.
As a robustness check for our rejection of (H4), we investigated one final possibility:
that the coverage of atheists in general is more similar to that seen in Table 6 than the
aggregate data shown in Table 5. Specifically, it might be that the average tone of sentences
referencing atheists is pulled down because the media frequently identify people who do
something dislikable as atheist. If that is the case, it might be that more general references
to atheists are not as negative as the aggregate data suggest. For example, we know
that African Americans are overrepresented as criminals in the news compared to crime
statistics (Dixon 2019, p. 246), and it has been shown that this has an effect on public
attitudes (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). An analogous process might be at work with media
portrayals of atheists.
If the media over-identify atheists who do something dislikable, we would expect
the phrases “who is (an) atheist,” “who are atheist(s),” and “, an atheist,” (including the
commas at the start and end) to be associated frequently with negative descriptions or
accounts of the person(s) in question. In our corpus, a total of just 70 articles (out of
more than 15,000) contain one of these phrases. Of those, not one is used to identify as
atheist someone who has done something that makes them a criminal or untrustworthy.
Instead, the phrasing is used to identify leaders such as British politicians Nick Clegg
and Ed Miliband when they interact with religious figures (the Pope, the Archbishop
of Canterbury, etc.) or other people whose atheism may help explain why they find
themselves in a particular situation (a cartoonist or a chess player each perceived to have
made fun of Christianity, for example).15
There is a single example of the phrase “who are atheists” being used in a way that
might seem to cast aspersions on atheists: “Doctors who are atheist or agnostic are twice
as likely to take decisions that might shorten the life of somebody who is terminally ill as
doctors who are deeply religious.” However, the article in question takes pains to point
out that shortening life might in fact be the choice desired by a patient who is suffering. In
other words, the problem is not doctors who are atheists, but rather those whose views are
at odds with those of their terminally ill patients, whether religious or not.16 An interesting
contrast is offered in another article, from the same newspaper later that same year, about the
possibility of non-atheists being problematic. That article, about scientific experimentation
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on animals, argues that “scientists who are atheists need to be morally more rigorous than
those who believe animals were created for our use and exploitation.”17
6. Conclusions
Although scholars have established a widespread pattern of anti-atheist prejudice,
until now no study has systematically analyzed one plausible driver of such prejudice:
media coverage of atheism and atheists. We have done so here, analyzing print media
coverage of atheism over a twenty-year period in the United Kingdom and the United States
in terms of its overall tone, its topics, and its treatment of prominent and less prominent
atheists. As such, the present study contributes to the broader literature on public prejudice
against atheists and atheism, which has until now largely focused on characterizing and
measuring this prejudice (Edgell et al. 2016; Gervais et al. 2017; Norenzayan et al. 2016). The
findings presented here offer important insights into one likely source of public attitudes.
Specifically, we have shown that coverage of atheism is negative overall. While
articles in which atheism or atheists are referenced have, on average, a nearly neutral tone,
sentences directly mentioning atheism or atheists are decidedly negative. While a number
of scholars have argued that the US and the UK have become increasingly secularized and
therefore perhaps less pro-religion, our findings indicate that such secularization has not
led to positive treatment of atheism or atheists. Our analysis also shows that coverage of
atheism is not specifically associated with negative topics. While references to atheists and
atheism may be comparatively more common in foreign news coverage, which is often
negative, most coverage in our atheism corpus is not about foreign topics, and a number of
those non-foreign topics are not negative: faith, science, and education, for instance.
The key theoretical contribution of this article is to demonstrate, for the first time, that
media coverage mirrors an important difference in public attitudes between individualtargeted and group-targeted tolerance. Specifically, the literature on the dilution effect
shows that people tend to think less negatively about individual members of a group than
they think about the overall group and its characteristics. Given the close links between
media content and public attitudes, it was plausible that media coverage would reflect a
similar difference; however, this had not previously been demonstrated. We show that
negativity in the media is more strongly linked to the coverage of atheism (the idea that
constitutes the group) than it is to atheists, as individual people. Sentences referencing
“atheism” or “atheistic” are notably more negative than those referencing “atheist” or
“atheists” on average. This is true both for the entire corpus and for the subset that is not
about foreign news.
In addition, among the words whose presence in sentences referencing “atheism”
or “atheistic” stands out most, we find clearly negative words such as “dogmatic” and
“insulting”; no such similarly negative words appear in the corresponding list for “atheist”
and “atheists”. Finally, we show that coverage of the most visible atheist public intellectuals
is neutral—more positive, in other words, than the coverage of lesser-known or unnamed
atheists. This finding cuts directly against the alternative hypothesis that the negative
connotation of atheism is driven to a considerable degree by negative impressions people
have of prominent atheist figures.
Most of the literature on anti-atheist prejudice has glossed over the possibility that this
prejudice is attached more to the idea of atheism and to the abstract group it represents than
to specific individuals who subscribe to that idea. For example, the largest cross-national
source of data about anti-atheist prejudice is the World Values Survey, which contains a
question about whether a respondent deems someone who does not believe in a god fit for
public office (Inglehart et al. 2004). Negative responses to this question have traditionally
been interpreted as evidence of prejudice against atheists (e.g., Gervais 2011, p. 546);
however, in light of our findings here, such responses might more accurately be interpreted
as reflecting prejudice against atheism.
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This is not to suggest that there is no prejudice against atheists: Clearly prejudice
against atheism and prejudice against atheists are related. However, our findings indicate
that the media do not communicate strong negativity vis-à-vis famous atheist individuals,
and while coverage of less well-known or unnamed atheists is modestly negative, it is
measurably less negative than coverage of atheism. In sum, our findings suggest that
public dislike—at least, in so far as it is reflective of media coverage—may be centered
around an aversion to non-belief, rather than of individual atheists or of any perceived
implications of atheism for a person’s character or behavior. Given that the number of
people who do not believe in a god continues to grow around the world and that more and
more of them are likely to seek public office, among other activities, accurately identifying
the root causes and contents of anti-atheist beliefs appears more important than ever.
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Notes
1

2

3

4

5

6
7
8

9

Circulation data from https://www.agilitypr.com/resources/top-media-outlets/top-10-daily-american-newspape
rs/ (accessed on 31 March 2021). “Newspaper of record” information from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newspa
per_of_record (accessed on 31 March 2021).
We excluded positive and negative words directly associated with our topic of interest from the sentiment calculation.
Specifically, we ignored “atheist”, which appears as negative in one lexicon, as well as “christian” (two lexica) and
“church” (one lexicon), which appear as positive terms. For more information about all eight lexica and the sentiment
analysis algorithm, see Bleich and van der Veen (Forthcoming).
A useful way to think of topic modeling algorithms is that they attempt to reduce the complexity of texts by
identifying a specified number of semantic features: They summarize texts, in a way.
Specifically, we calculated average mutual coherence (as measured by cosine distance) of the top 10 words in the
topic.
NMF topic models tend to produce one or more “junk” topics; these can be seen as aggregates for all smaller topics
whose contents do not fit nicely into one of the topics generated. As the number of topics produced by the model
increases, these “junk” topics will become less and less significant. In our case, there is one such topic. More than
40% of all the texts in our corpus have this “topic” as their top topic. Because we could not meaningfully assign
these articles to a particular topic, we ignored them in the analyses presented below. Including them instead did
not change our substantive findings. The Supplementary Materials provide replication information including these
articles.
Sally Quinn writes about religion for the Washington Post.
Michael Newdow filed a prominent lawsuit against the reciting of the Pledge of Allegiance in US in public schools.
This can be explained in part by the explicit separation of church and state in the First Amendment of the US
Constitution; a similar separation does not exist in the United Kingdom.
The Supplementary Materials provide the analogous results if we also include those articles whose top “topic” is the
generic (non-meaningful) topic. All substantive findings remain the same for this larger corpus of 13,092 articles.
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10
11

12
13

14

15

16
17

17 of 20

Both correlation values exclude the two country-specific topics.
A word has to occur at least 10 times in our corpus to be included. The words are ranked in order of how
disproportionate their presence is in sentences including one of our key terms. All of these associations are
statistically significant. Not all words listed are pure adjectives: a number of the words can be used in either adjective
or noun form. The list includes single words only; hyphenated adjectives (e.g., “non-religious”) are ignored.
The difference between the two values is statistically significant (p-value = 0.03).
In religious discussions, dogmatic can also have a positive connotation. However, in newspaper coverage, it is
almost invariably associated with the negative colloquial meaning of expressing opinions strongly and perhaps
arrogantly, as if they were fact.
These data reflect our full corpus, not just the articles about non-foreign topics included in Table 5. The values for the
non-foreign subset are even more positive.
The cartoonist example is from “Online cartoons challenge stereotypes” (Washington Post, 27 December 2014). The
chess player example is from “Grandmaster under fire after mocking chess player prayer” (Daily Telegraph, 12
March 2018).
“Atheist doctors more likely to hasten death” (Guardian, 26 August 2010).
“Blood, smoke, and rubble” (Guardian, 13 November 2010).
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